The Problem with SSH Agent Forwarding
After hacking the matrix.org website today, the attacker opened a series of GitHub issues mentioning the flaws he discovered. In one of those issues, he mentions that “complete compromise could have been avoided if developers were prohibited from using [SSH agent forwarding].”
man ssh_config has to say about
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent’s Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
Simply put: if your jump box is compromised and you use SSH agent forwarding to connect to another machine through it, then you risk also compromising the target machine!
Instead, you should use either
ProxyJump (added in
OpenSSH 7.3). That way, ssh will forward the TCP connection to the
target host via the jump box and the actual connection will be made on
your workstation. If someone on the jump box tries to MITM your
connection, then you will be warned by ssh.
Here’s what a config file that uses
ProxyCommand might look like:
And here’s the equivalent config using
Of course, you can also specify either option via the command line: